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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of some of the most frequent simile-based 
idiomatic expressions from a cognitive point of view. In our study we show the 
necessity to further develop conventional metaphoric and metonymic analysis into more 
complex patterns of interaction between the two. Furthermore, several metaphors may 
also interact in the cognitive processes that underlie the understanding of idiomatic 
expressions, making it necessary to approach many of our examples making use of 
metaphoric complexes. We will explore the ways in which motivation and transparency 
may vary in idioms that arise from the same ontological metaphor, both 
intralinguistically and cross-linguistically.  In addition, we will regard hyperbole as a 
fairly pervasive phenomenon in simile-based idioms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The distinction between literal and figurative language has traditionally relegated the 
latter to the periphery of linguistic accounts, mainly on the basis of the claim that 
figurative language is anomalous or deviant. However, it has been argued –especially 
within Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999) and Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995)– that the so-called figurative uses of language are as 
frequent (and even more frequent) than the literal ones (see also Vega, 2007; Sperber 
and Wilson, 2008; Wilson and Carston, 2006, 2008). This is the case of idioms, which 
are highly pervasive in our everyday speech, and whose meaning is not literal 
whatsoever (Gibbs, 1994). Traditional views of idioms claim that they are fixed 
expressions whose meaning is arbitrary and cannot therefore be predicted from the 
meanings of their constituents. Furthermore, it has been adduced that idioms are often 
constructed on the basis of dead metaphors, i.e. metaphors that must have been 
originally transparent and productive but whose form-meaning connections have been 
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lost over time. From these assumptions, one may infer that the cognitive operations we 
use for our conceptualization and understanding of the world (namely, metaphor and 
metonymy) are of no use in the interpretation of idiomatic expressions. However, the 
notion of idiom(s) and the considerations regarding their processing operations have 
evolved considerably. Cognitive approaches advocate that the distinction between literal 
and figurative language can no longer be maintained. The distinction between 
conventional and non-conventional language largely relies on the assumption that 
conventional language is the one that we use in our everyday speech, while non-
conventional language exclusively concerns literary texts and rhetorical discourse. 
Nevertheless, everyday expressions like I have butterflies in my stomach are not 
restricted to the literary realm at all, and their meanings cannot be said to be literal. 
Cases of this kind underscore an inconsistency regarding the distinction between 
conventional and non-conventional language. As part of a ‘special’ use of language, 
idioms have been traditionally regarded as linguistic units that are larger than words and 
that are attributed arbitrary meaning. This view of idioms is in line with those 
approaches to the processing of idioms called non-compositional models, which claim 
that the meaning of idioms is arbitrary and always independent of the meaning of its 
constituent parts, so that they need to be learned by heart (Bobrow and Bell, 1973; 
Swinney and Cutler, 1979; Schweigert and Moates, 1988, among others). In turn, 
compositional models argue that the meaning of idioms is not completely arbitrary. In 
fact, they defend the view that the meanings of the words that make up an idiomatic 
expression contribute to a certain extent to its overall figurative meaning (Cacciari and 
Glucksberg, 1991, 1994; Fillmore et al., 1988; Gibbs, 1990, 1994, 1998; Gibbs and 
Nayak, 1989; Gibbs and Van Orden, 2003; Glucksberg, 1991, 2001; Glucksberg et al., 
1993; Keysar et al., 2000; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1990). Some of these 
authors (especially Lakoff and his followers) highlight the essential role of metaphor 
and metonymy in the interpretation of the so-called figurative meaning (see also 
Geeraerts 2003). 
However, the relevance of metaphor and metonymy as conceptualizing tools has 
not always been acknowledged. Traditional views considered these to be deviant uses of 
language whose main purpose was merely to embellish literary texts. Like idioms, 
metaphor and metonymy were also considered to be a special use of language, that is, 
literary language, with metaphor and metonymy belonging to restricted and somehow 
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secondary areas of study. From the times of Socrates and Plato metaphor and metonymy 
were analyzed as rhetorical tropes, that is, as parts of persuasive discourse and regarded 
as distinct from straightforward speech (Fogelin, 1988; Harris and Taylor, 1996; Way, 
1991). Furthermore, metaphor and metonymy were regarded merely as linguistic issues, 
without taking into consideration their impact on conceptualization. Summing up, the 
importance of idioms on the one hand and metaphor and metonymy on the other has 
been underestimated. 
The emergence of Cognitive Linguistics meant a challenge to the standard views 
of metaphor, metonymy and form-meaning relationships among others. This kind of 
approach departs from the assumption that language is a reflection of the patterns of 
organization of our thoughts, so the study of language involves the description and 
analysis of patterns of conceptualization (Evans and Green, 2006). This new view of the 
study of language arose from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), further developed 
in Lakoff (1987, 1993), Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) Their 
contribution involved many changes in very important aspects of the study of language, 
such as the development of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, or CMT, which has been 
followed and subsequently improved over the years by various scholars. A necessarily 
non-exhaustive list would include the following: Barcelona (2000, 2005), Gibbs (1994), 
Gibbs and Steen (1999), Kövecses (1996, 2000, 2002, 2005), Fauconnier and Turner 
(1994, 1998, 2002), Steen (2007) and Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators (e.g. Ruiz 
de Mendoza, 1997, 1999, 2008; Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2007). The developments of this theory 
made by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002) regarding the 
role of metaphor and metonymy in conceptual interaction, and by Ruiz de Mendoza 
(2008) concerning metaphoric chains, more recently referred to as metaphoric 
complexes (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2010), are particularly relevant for our study, 
since they  provide the necessary tools to determine the cognitive grounding of a large 
number of idioms thereby allowing us to come up with a more refined account of our 
object of study. 
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2. Scope of the study and methodology 
 
The present paper is in line with the above-mentioned cognitive approach to language, 
and sets out to corroborate that idioms can indeed be analyzed in terms of cognitive 
operations (cf. Herrero, 2009; Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez, 2003; Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Peña, 2005; Ruiz de Mendoza, 2010), especially metaphor and metonymy, not only in 
isolation but also in their mutual interaction. We will refine the existing accounts by 
making use of the explanatory tools mentioned above. Furthermore, we will 
demonstrate that these cognitive operations are not restricted to the understanding of 
idiomatic expressions regarding mental states and emotions, as has been suggested by 
some authors (Kreuz and Graesser, 1991; Eizaga Rebollar, 2002).  
 The fact that very little attention has been paid to simile-based idiomatic 
expressions has led us to select these as our object study. Our investigation is primarily 
concerned with showing the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of cognitive analyses 
in the study of idioms that involve emotions/mental states. It is true that much of the 
emphasis in the analysis of idioms has been placed on emotion metaphors (Kövecses, 
2000, 2002; Kövecses and Szabó, 1996). However, this should not by any means be 
taken to mean that cognitive approaches cannot be duplicated for other kinds of 
reasoning processes and expressions. This paper is in full consonance with the stance 
taken by Kovecses and Szabó (1996) in the sense that it advocates that most idioms bear 
a great deal of systematic cognitive motivation in their interpretation. However, their 
analysis is largely restricted to emotion metaphors and thus needs to be expanded. 
Another aspect that will be subjected to closer scrutiny is the fact that they treat 
metaphor and metonymy separately and in a rather simplistic way, neglecting the 
complex patterns of interaction that may arise between them. An added bonus of our 
approach is the fact that we base our selection of examples not only on metaphor and/or 
metonymy types (e.g. emotion metaphors, ontological metaphors, etc.) but also on a 
largely neglected constructional type (simile), which will pave the way for the 
discussion of a wider range of conceptual patterns. 
Idioms have been sampled from a wide variety of sources, including bilingual 
dictionaries (The Oxford English Dictionary), monolingual dictionaries (The Longman 
Dictionary of Contemporary English) and dictionaries of idioms (A Dictionary of 
Everyday Idioms, Idioms Organizer, A Dictionary of American Idioms). In our 
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preliminary analysis it was observed that most simile-based idiomatic expressions in our 
corpus of analysis were based on either ontological or situational metaphors. Even 
though one might initially assume that ontological metaphors are fairly simple as 
regards the cognitive processes that rule their interpretation, we have found that an 
exhaustive and careful analysis was needed, as the complexity of idioms based on 
ontological metaphors is highly variable. Furthermore, there are many cases in which 
the same ontological metaphor gives rise to several simile-based idioms whose 
cognitive operations range from a straightforward one-correspondence metaphoric 
mapping to complex patterns of conceptual interaction. Thus, we have grouped our 
examples into the most basic ontological pattern underlying them. For example, we will 
talk about the various idiomatic expressions that arise from the ontological metaphor 
(e.g. John is a pig, meaning John eats like a pig, John sweats like a pig, etc.) that need 
different cognitive operations for their interpretation. This takes us to the next step, that 
is, the analysis of simile-based idioms that make use of situational cognitive models. 
Within this category, we have found that hyperbole plays a crucial role in the 
construction of idioms. 
This study analyzes the interactional conceptual patterns regardless of the degree 
of complexity that, as advanced above, may significantly vary within the same group of 
idioms. In any case, the prevalence of certain interactional patterns within each category 
will be pointed out and conveniently schematized. In our analysis we have followed the 
account of metaphor-metonymy patterns of conceptual interaction discussed in Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Díez (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002). The strength of this 
approach to metaphor and metonymy in interaction has been recently validated in a 
study carried out by Urios-Aparisi (2009) in the domain of multimodal metaphor. We 
have productively combined the former account with the more recent discussion of 
metaphorical complexes provided in Ruiz de Mendoza (2008) and Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Mairal (2010). Special attention will be paid to a number of cases that somehow 
shed new light on these matters.  
The structure of the rest of this article is as follows. First, in Section 3 we outline 
the main contributions to the development of cognitive approaches involving the 
processing of idioms, and of metaphor and metonymy as tools for the analysis of 
language in general and of idiomatic expressions in particular. In section 4 we present a 
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detailed analysis of idioms that take the structure of a simile. Finally, section 5 
recapitulates the main findings of this study. 
 
3. Theoretical bacground 
 
One of the goals of Cognitive Linguistics is to determine and classify the systematic 
processes that allow a person to understand abstract concepts in terms or more tangible, 
physical experience. Lakoff (1987, 1989) postulated Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs 
henceforth) as cognitive mechanisms in terms of which we organize our knowledge of 
the world. He described four structuring principles for ICMs: propositional structure, 
image-schematic structure, metaphoric and metonymic mappings. Propositional ICMs 
(or frames; cf. Fillmore, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins, 1992) are based on sets of 
predicate-argument descriptions (e.g. a mother is a woman; a mother has children; a 
mother takes care of her children, etc.: cf. Lakoff, 1987; Taylor, 1995). Image schemas 
(Johnson, 1987) are topological constructs that arise from our sensory motor experience 
with the world (e.g. notions such as in/out, up/down, motion along a path, part-whole 
relations, etc.; cf. Peña, 2003, 2008; Hampe, 2005). Metaphors are described as sets of 
correspondences across discrete conceptual domains (e.g. He is drowning in sorrow, 
maps a liquid onto a negative emotion, the container onto a situation, being immersed in 
the liquid onto the devastating effects of affliction). Metonymies are one-
correspondence mappings (understood as ‘stands for’ relationships) within a single 
conceptual domain (e.g. ‘shoes’ in Tie your shoes stands for ‘shoe laces’, which are a 
part of what we understand by shoes) (see Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000). ICMs have been 
further sub-classified by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) into operational (i.e. metaphor and 
metonymy) and non-operational (i.e. frames and image-schemas) cognitive models. 
This distinction captures the processual nature of metaphor and metonymy, which 
always works on the basis of propositional (i.e. frames) or image-schematic ICMs. With 
these premises in mind, we will follow Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez’s (2002) description 
of interaction patterns between metaphor and metonymy. According to these authors, 
ICMs combine and interact in principled ways that will be addressed in some detail in 
section 3.2. In this section we will also address the description of metaphoric complexes 
(Ruiz de Mendoza, 2008), i.e. when two or more metaphors combine for the 
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understanding of a given expression. As we will show, metaphoric complexes are 
essential for a fully-fledged analysis of certain idiomatic expressions. We will thus 
attempt to combine several complementary approaches with the aim of providing a 
preliminary set of systematic patterns of conceptual operations in the processing of 
simile-based idioms.  
 
3.1 Classifications of metaphor 
 
In Metaphors We Live By (1980), Lakoff and Johnson present a tentative classification 
of metaphors, providing many examples of each type. They divide metaphors into three 
basic categories, according to the nature of the source domain: orientational (those that 
relate abstract concepts to experiences involving spatial orientation in order to help us 
understand these concepts on experiential grounds; e.g. MORE IS UP); ontological 
(those that allow us to speak about abstract entities in terms of physical objects, e.g. I 
have a lot of love in my heart) and structural (in which two concepts, one more abstract 
than the other, are interrelated; e.g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY). These three categories 
arise from the analysis of only one of the aspects that may be analyzed in metaphors, 
that is, the source domain. The category of orientational metaphors was later enlarged in 
order to include both spatial and topological constructs. Lakoff and Turner (1989) 
named the members of this new group image-schematic metaphors. In this work, they 
also put forward the concept of the Great Chain of Being, a folk model of nature by 
virtue of which entities are organized hierarchically in such a way that each level of the 
chain inherits the properties of the lower ones and incorporates a new one that makes 
each level more complex. In the Great Chain, each level has a defining property that is 
not inherited by the levels below. For example, humans are rational (but not animals, 
plants or things); animals (but not plants or things) have instinctual behavior; plants (but 
not things) are living entities, and so on.  This classification has been improved by Ruiz 
de Mendoza and Otal (2002) and by Peña (2003). These authors argue for the necessity 
to recognize the importance of metonymy within cognitive approaches to language and 
thought modeling. While the analysis of metaphor had played a central role in the 
reaction against the traditional view of conceptualization, which drew a sharp line 
between literal and figurative language, metonymy had nonetheless been unduly 
neglected. Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) follow three different criteria in their 
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classification of metaphor: (i) the nature of the source domain; (ii) the complexity of the 
mapping system, as determined by the number of correspondences in the mapping; (iii) 
the nature of such correspondences. They claim that depending on the number of 
correspondences involved in the metaphoric mapping, a basic distinction should be 
drawn between structural and non-structural metaphors. The former always involve 
more than one correspondence (e.g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, in which we find several 
correspondences like ‘lovers are travelers’, ‘the love relationship is a vehicle’, 
‘difficulties in the relationship are impediments to travel, ‘lovers’ common goals are the 
destination’, and so on), while in the latter we only find a single correspondence. Non-
structural metaphors include Lakoff and Johnson’s orientational metaphors (e.g. MORE 
IS UP) as well as ontological metaphors (e.g. PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS). Furthermore, 
structural (many-correspondence) metaphors are subdivided into situational and non-
situational metaphors. In turn, non-situational metaphors may be image-schematic 
metaphors (in which the source domain is made up of one or more image-schemas, e.g. 
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE), image metaphors (the source and 
the same domain are images that share a certain degree of resemblance, e.g. My wife… 
whose waist is an hourglass, from Lakoff, 1993) and propositional metaphors (the 
abstract concept of the target domain is understood in terms of a non-situational 
construct in the source domain, as in ARGUMENT IS WAR). Image and image-
schematic metaphors are topological, while propositional metaphors are non-
topological. Finally, situational metaphors require the use of a metonymic mapping 
within the metaphoric source domain that expands a fragment of a situation into a 
complete one. If this situation can be observed externally we have a scenic situational 
metaphor (e.g. He ran with his tail between his legs). If it cannot be observed in such a 
way, we get a non-scenic situational metaphor (e.g. He had his heart in his mouth). This 
classification is diagrammed in figure 1 below. 
 If we take into account the nature of the mapping, following Grady (1997), we 
may distinguish between resemblance and correlation metaphors; the former are based 
on perceived similarities between source and target (e.g. the enamel of teeth resembles 
the coating of a pearl), while the latter are grounded in the conflation of concepts (e.g. 
anger and heat are conflated on the basis of our experience of feeling physical heat 
when being enraged). 
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     Orientational metaphors 
 
 
  Non-structural  
  metaphors 
Ontological metaphors 
Image-
schematic 
metaphors 
 
        Topological 
        metaphors 
          Image 
          metaphors 
 
     Non-situational 
     metaphors 
Metaphors 
 
        Non-topological 
        (propositional) 
        metaphors 
Structural 
  metaphors 
         
Non-scenic metaphors 
 
 
     Situational 
     metaphors 
 
        Scenic metaphors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Metaphor types according to the nature of the source domain (Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Otal, 2002: 52). 
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3.2. Metaphor and metonymy in interaction 
 
The classification above will serve us as a guiding tool in our analysis of idiomatic 
expressions based on similes. However, the cognitive operations described and 
classified above are not always sufficient. We need more sophisticated tools for the 
cognitive analysis of many idiomatic expressions. These tools arise mainly from the 
combination of two or more metaphors (metaphoric complexes) and from the 
interaction of metaphor and metonymy.  
As we briefly outlined above, metaphoric complexes have been defined by Ruiz 
de Mendoza (2008) as the conceptual interaction between two (or more) metaphors. 
There are two kinds of metaphoric complexes. In one kind of complex, a metaphor is 
built into the source-target structure of another metaphor. A case in point is the 
expression She got the idea across to me, whose meaning impact is accounted for by the 
integration into the metaphor IDEAS ARE (MOVING) OBJECTS of the metaphor 
UNDERSTANDING AN IDEA IS PERCEPTUALLY EXPLORING AN OBJECT. 
The incorporation of the latter metaphor into the conceptual layout of the former is a 
consequence of the fact that the main metaphor requires further elaboration of the basic 
correspondence between understanding and receiving an object. This is so since just 
gaining access to (i.e. receiving) a moving object does not necessarily involve knowing 
its characteristics. 
 
SOURCE Æ      TARGET 
Causer of motion Communicator 
Causing motion Communicating 
Object of caused-motion (moving 
object) 
Idea 
Destination of motion (receiver of the 
moving object) 
Addressee 
Receiving the moving object Having access to the idea 
Perceptually exploring the object Understanding the idea 
 
Fig. 2. Single-source metaphorical complex in She got the idea across to me 
 
 
Another kind of combination allows two source domains to be mapped onto a 
single target domain, thereby combining conceptual inferences that arise from two 
distinct basic metaphors. That is the case of the following example of chaining (Ruiz the 
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Mendoza and Mairal, 2010) in figure 3, which results in a metaphoric complex: He 
slapped some sense into me (‘He caused me to acquire some sense by slapping me’, i.e. 
‘He slapped me and in so doing caused me to acquire some sense’). 
 
SOURCE Æ TARGET Å SOURCE 
Causer of motion Effector (‘he’)  
Causing motion Effecting (‘caused to 
acquire’) 
 
Destination of motion Effectee (‘me’) New possessor of an object 
Object of caused-motion 
(moving object) 
New property (‘some sense’)  
 Resultant state (acquiring the 
new property of ‘having some 
sense’) 
Gaining possession of an 
object 
Manner of causing motion Manner of effecting 
(slapping) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Double-source metaphorical complex in He slapped some sense into me. 
      
 
As regards the interaction patterns between metaphor and metonymy, Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Díez (2002) posit five different patterns in which metaphor and 
metonymy may interact: (i) metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source (e.g. to beat 
one’s breast): (ii) metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target (e.g. to knit one’s 
brows); (iii) metonymic reduction of (one of the correspondences of) the target domain 
of a metaphor (e.g. to win someone’s heart); (iv) metonymic expansion of (one of the 
correspondences of) the target domain of a metaphor (e.g. to catch someone’s ear); (v) 
and metonymic expansion of one of the correspondences of the source domain (e.g.to 
bite the hand that feeds you)1. These interaction patterns improve on a previous study by 
Goossens (1990), who proposes an alternative classification: (i) metaphor from 
metonymy, where an original metonymy develops into a metaphor (e.g. to beat one’s 
breast); (ii) metonymy within metaphor, as in to bite one’s tongue, where the tongue 
stands for a person’s ability to speak; (iii) demetonymization inside a metaphor, as in to 
pay lip service, where ‘lip service’, which stands for ‘speaking’, loses its metonymic 
import so that the expression makes sense; (iv) metaphor within metonymy, which 
occurs when a metaphor is used in order to add expressiveness to a metonymy, as in to 
be on one’s hind legs, where “hind” brings up the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS.  
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of these examples see Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal, 2002, section 3.3.2. 
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Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) have addressed the main problems in 
Goossens’s proposal. One crucial difference between Goossens’ proposal and the one in 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002) is that in the latter metonymy is always a part of 
metaphor (either the source or the target). In Goossens’ account there is only one case 
where metonymy is recognized to be a part of metaphor. The rest of the proposed cases 
of interaction are misled. Thus, to beat one’s breast has a metaphoric source where a 
person beats his/her breast in order to show sorrow or regret and the target has a person 
that makes an open show of his/her regret without necessarily beating his/her breast. 
This means that, in order to construct the metaphoric source domain. we need the 
breast-beating action to afford access to the whole scenario where a person uses breast-
beating as a way to make an evident demonstration of remorse; that is, we construct the 
metaphoric source (but not the target) on the basis of expanding part of a scenario into a 
whole scenario. While the metonymy is thus part of the metaphoric source –the first of 
the possibilities discussed by Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002)–, it is somewhat 
inaccurate to say that the metaphor originates in a metonymy. In our view, a more 
important problem arises in Goossens’s contention that a metonymy may lose its value 
as such within a metaphoric frame. It is not clear at all whether Goossens actually 
argues that the metaphor is the reason why the demetonymization process occurs or 
whether it is simply a contributing factor. In any case, an expression such as pay lip 
service is better accounted for as an example of metonymic reduction of one of the 
correspondences of the target domain of a metaphor whose source domain is based on 
the ‘paying’ frame, which features at least a payer, a payee and a payment. This 
structure maps onto a target domain where the payment is ‘lip service’, which stands for 
‘service with words’ rather than with actions. In this case, there is no demetonymization 
but simply a metonymic shift inside a metaphoric target. Finally, in to be on one’s hind 
legs does invoke the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, but as an element of a more 
complex situational metaphor in which the source domain depicts a horse rearing up 
when feeling in danger of being attacked. In this metaphor, the target domain is the 
person that stands up to argue in public when his views come under attack from 
someone else. To this analysis, provided by Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002), we may 
add one important observation: the interactional schema is essentially the same as in e.g. 
beat one’s breast, except for the integration of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS within the 
general metaphorical scenario that we have described. Therefore, we have a 
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combination of two metaphors and the metonymic development of the integrated 
metaphoric source (see figure 4 below): 
 
 
 
                  METAPHOR 
 
SOURCE Æ  
TARGET 
 
a horse an arguer 
raising its forelegs raising his arms 
in a threatening way in a threatening way 
when feeling under (physical) attack when feeling under (verbal) attack 
 
                   METONYMY 
 
 
rearing up on its standing up on his 
hind legs rear and legs 
  
Fig. 4. Metonymic expansion of a single-source metaphorical complex in He’s on his 
hind legs 
 
 
This analysis integrates insights from the account of metaphor-metonymy 
interaction discussed in Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Otal (2002) into the account of metaphorical complexes provided in Ruiz de Mendoza 
(2008) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2010). It must be noted that the horse-arguer 
metaphor is not a typical ontological (or Great Chain of Being) metaphor, but a 
situational model which builds upon the ontological mapping PEOPLE ARE 
ANIMALS and whose complete source domain is accessed on the basis of partial 
structure (the image of the animal rising on its hind legs). When it is not part of a larger 
metaphorical framework, PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS is used to put in correspondence 
human and animal attributes. As noted in Ruiz de Mendoza (1998), such attributes are 
often behavioral (She’s a cow ‘unpleasant’, She’s a dragon ‘unfriendly’, He’s a fox ‘a 
deceptive person’, He had a sheepish look on his face ‘embarrassed’) but can also refer 
to physical characteristics: He’s a bull of a man ‘a heavyset man’. In a sentence like He 
was on his hind legs, the term “hind”, which is used with quadrupeds, is figuratively 
attributed to a man. This differentiates this metaphor from one like He beat his breast, 
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where the source is also constructed through metonymic expansion, but where there is 
no metaphoric complex, i.e.  the source contains no figurative ingredient.  
In what follows, we will examine examples from our corpus in the light of the 
patterns discussed in Ruiz De Mendoza and Díez (2002), and will broaden the array of 
possibilities of combination on the basis of our corpus.  
 
3.3. Definition and processing of idioms 
 
3.3.1. Definition 
 
The concept of idiom is often defined in fuzzy terms and with lack of specific 
boundaries, and it is used to refer to structures that range from phrasal expressions to 
proverbs. Some authors claim that idioms are specific lexical expressions whose 
syntactic form is fixed or semi-fixed, and whose semantic structure is opaque to a 
certain extent (McCarthy, 1992; Moon, 1998a, 1998b). Those linguists that advocate for 
a very restricted view of this matter state that idioms are strings of more than one word 
whose conventional meaning can never be recovered from the meanings of its 
individual components (Everaert, et al., 1995; Fernando, 1996; Hernando Cuadrado, 
1990; Nunberg, et al. 1994; Strässler, 1982). These authors argue that idioms are 
semantically opaque expressions whose overall meaning is not equivalent to the sum of 
their parts. Therefore, idioms are not analyzable either syntactically or semantically. 
According to Fillmore et al. (1988), an idiom is an expression endowed with a specific 
interpretation by the speakers of a community. They distinguish between encoding and 
decoding idioms. Encoding idioms are those that can be understood by speakers of a 
language without having learned them beforehand, but that are not recognized as fully 
conventional, e.g. answer the door. Decoding idioms are expressions that need to be 
learned beforehand in order to understand their meaning, e.g. kick the bucket.  
In our view, idioms are those expressions that bear a certain degree of fixation and 
whose meanings need to be deciphered in terms of cognitive operations, such as 
metaphor and metonymy, to a greater or lesser extent. However, given that idioms vary 
as regards their degree of fixation/predictability, they should be best handled in terms of 
a continuum. At one of the extremes of this continuum we find a number of idioms 
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whose meaning is totally unpredictable from the meaning of their parts individually, 
which means that they need to be learned as fixed expressions. This is the case of 
opaque idioms (e.g. kick the bucket). Opaque idioms should thus be considered as 
special cases of idioms that assimilate to individual words in the sense that their 
syntactic properties and meanings are exclusively related to the form that comprise 
them. However, this view should be restricted to a limited number of idioms. Nor can it 
be taken as criterial to define idioms. The next group in the middle of the continuum is 
made up of idioms whose parts convey information that can somehow be interpreted 
with the aid of cognitive operations, but may still be learned as a whole. An example of 
this kind of idiom is spill the beans. This expression is highly conventionalized, and its 
meaning cannot be recovered from the literal interpretation of its constituents. 
Nevertheless, metaphorical correspondences can be established between ‘spill’ and 
‘reveal’, and between ‘beans’ and ‘secrets’, so that the individual components of the 
expression aid in the overall interpretation. In fact, the structure of the expression may 
be altered in some contexts and for several purposes. For instance, a speaker who is 
aware of the fact that s/he should have not revealed certain information and who intends 
to apologize in an informal way may utter Ooops, I may have spilled some of the beans. 
However, it is not clear whether speakers of a language have access to this 
interpretation on the basis of a direct form-meaning connection or by taking into 
account the individual parts of the idiom. This issue is not, however, the focus of the  
present study. Rather, our aim is to demonstrate that cognitive processes may play a role 
in the understanding of idiomatic expressions, independently of the fact that speakers 
may also store the meaning of certain constructs as wholes. We should thus assume that 
idioms do not necessarily need to be analyzed as independent units because we can 
establish principled conceptual patterns and categories within which several idiomatic 
expressions fall. The other extreme of the continuum leads us to consider a wide range 
of expressions that are more likely to be interpreted by using cognitive operations as the 
main tool of analysis: transparent idioms. These should be understood as expressions 
that are fixed to a certain extent and whose parts are determinant in the overall 
interpretation. That comes only after a number of more or less complex cognitive 
operations have taken place, e.g. He is spitting fire. In this example, the conceptual 
metaphor that underlies the idiomatic expression is ANGER IS FIRE, which puts in 
correspondence some of the physiological symptoms of anger (e.g. excessive bodily 
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heat as if the body were burning inside) with the underlying emotion (see Kövecses, 
2000, 2005, for a detailed analysis of anger metaphors).  
 
3.3.2. Processing 
 
As regards the processing of idioms, we have already introduced the notions of non-
compositional and compositional models. Let us address and explore some of them in 
further detail. 
 
3.3.2.1. Non-compositional models  
 
These models advocate that the meaning of an idiom is fixed in memory, so it is 
recovered as a whole when the expression is uttered, leaving no room for any kind of 
cognitive operation. Within non-compositional models, the Literal Processing Model 
(Schweigert and Cutler, 1979) suggests that the processing of idiomatic expressions is 
different from the processing of literal expressions, and only gets activated when the 
literal meaning fails to provide an appropriate meaning for the expression. This would 
mean that the processing of literal meanings would take less time than the processing of 
figurative meanings. However, several scholars have conducted experiments impinging 
on the processing of idioms that indicate that the default interpretation is the idiomatic 
meaning, not the literal one (Gibbs, 1980, 1985; Titone and Connine, 1994). The Direct 
Access Hypothesis (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988; Gibbs, Nayak and Cutting, 1989; 
Glucksberg, 1993), by contrast, makes the opposite claim: the literal meaning of an 
idiom is activated only if the figurative interpretation proves to be inappropriate, due to 
the strong figurative meaning conventionally assigned to idiomatic expressions. 
Furthermore, the quick activation of the figurative interpretation makes it possible for 
idiomatic expressions to be stored in memory as individual lexical units, so they are not 
processed as series of individual words (Chomsky, 1980; Keysar and Bly, 1995; 
Nicolas, 1995; Ortony et al., 1978; Pinker, 1994, 1999; Pulman, 1993; Schweigert and 
Moates, 1988). The Lexical Representation Hypothesis (Swinney and Cutler, 1979) 
states that there are no differences concerning the access to, and recovery of, literal and 
figurative language. Individual words and the lexical access to the whole expression are 
analyzed at the same time. Nevertheless, the processing of the literal meaning takes 
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longer, since a lexical, syntactic and semantic analysis of each component is necessary. 
There seem to be some inconsistencies in this theory, especially as regards the shorter 
time of processing for the figurative meaning, which clashes with their assumption that 
both literal and figurative meanings are processed in the same way and at the same time. 
 
3.3.2.2. Compositional models 
 
As stated above, compositional models argue that the individual components of 
idiomatic expressions systematically contribute to the understanding of the overall 
meaning. Let us briefly outline some of these models. According to the Configuration 
Hypothesis (Cacciari and Glucksberg, 1991; van de Voort and Vonk, 1995), the 
processing of idioms is literal until the moment in which we have enough information to 
recognize the idiomatic expression. On this view, we process the literal meaning of 
individual words, even if it may not be relevant for the understanding of the whole 
expression. The Idiom Decomposition Hypothesis (Gibbs, 1990) suggests that idioms 
are represented in the mental lexicon in different ways depending on the semantic 
analyzability of its individual components. If we assume that idioms have only one 
semantic representation, there is no way of explaining the syntactic flexibility of certain 
idioms. This model states that speakers analyze idioms from a compositional 
perspective because they acknowledge the metaphoric mapping from a source to a target 
domain. Cognitive Linguistics, as we have already discussed, allies itself closely with 
compositional models. 
 
4. Towards an analysis of simile-based idioms 
 
This paper is devoted to the analysis of those idioms whose overall meaning can be 
inferred by combining the meanings of their parts in a certain way, that is, idioms whose 
degree of motivation/predictability is fairly high. However, we will see that the 
cognitive operations that rule the interpretation of this kind of idiomatic expressions as 
well as their degree of transparency may vary. Transparency depends not only on 
decomposability, but also on the extent to which certain parameters are culturally 
conventionalized. For instance, it is highly conventional to think that the most salient 
Alicia Galera: A cognitive approach to simile-based idiomatic expressions 21 
 
 
 
clac 43/2010, 3-48 
 
characteristic of an elephant (when used in the description of human beings) is its heavy 
weight or its huge size. 
Within decomposable idioms, it is only logical to think that similes are the most 
likely to bear a high degree of transparency. However, even if this is the case for many 
idioms, we will see that there are also idiomatic expressions whose structure follows 
that of a simile in which transparency is absent.  
Those idioms that are constructed on the basis of a simile are apparently the ones 
that have the lowest degree of complexity in the cognitive operations involved in their 
understanding. We may surmise that they usually follow the pattern of a one-
correspondence metaphoric mapping. Nevertheless, our examples prove this assumption 
to be false in many cases. Most similes are based either on ontological (i.e. Great Chain 
of Being) or situational metaphors. In other words, some of these idiomatic expressions 
make use of an ontological metaphor, that is, there is a mapping of a property of an 
entity from the source onto the target domain, while other expressions are based on the 
mapping of a real/imaginary situation conventionally associated to the entity of the 
source domain. However, this does not mean that similes derived from ontological 
metaphors are always straightforward one-correspondence mappings from the source to 
the target domain. Therefore, there is a difference between those idioms that exploit a 
linguistic relation of identity/similarity and those that make use of a 
typical/conventional situation. Let us see them in turn. 
In our corpus of analysis, the vast majority of the idioms whose structure is that of 
a simile are based on ontological metaphors. As Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim, 
ontological metaphors follow the Great Chain of Being model; that is, in a hierarchy in 
which human beings are at the top, each part on the chain inherits features from the 
lower ones, and incorporates new characteristics that make them superior. From this 
assumption we get an array of metaphors: PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, PEOPLE ARE 
PLANTS, PEOPLE ARE COMPLEX OBJECTS, PEOPLE ARE NATURAL 
PHYSICAL THINGS. Let us consider the following instantiations of the metaphor 
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS: 
 
(1) Peter is a lion. 
(2) John is a shark. 
(3) Harry is a vulture. 
Alicia Galera: A cognitive approach to simile-based idiomatic expressions 22 
 
 
 
clac 43/2010, 3-48 
 
These two metaphorical expressions use an attribute of the animal in order to state 
something about a person. Example (1) maps the courage of a lion onto a feature of 
John’s personality, while (2) maps the voraciousness and predatory nature of sharks. 
Example (3) maps the opportunistic nature of vultures that arises from the fact that they 
are carrion-eating animals. In these cases, there is only one characteristic of the animal 
that is conventionally associated to human behavior. In this respect, we should bear in 
mind that not every quality of the physical entity in the source domain is susceptible of 
being mapped onto the target domain. As Lakoff (1993) points out, metaphors highlight 
certain aspects of concepts and hide others. Sentences (1), (2) and (3) are examples in 
which there is only one feature of the animal that can be applied to a human being. In 
addition, it is obvious that the features used in the mapping are easily identifiable and 
demonstrable in the animal. In this respect, consider examples (4) to (7) below: 
 
(4) Mary is a cow. 
(5) Jack is a rat.  
(6) He is as blind as a bat. 
(7) He is as happy as a lark. 
 
Examples (4) and (5) are statements about Mary’s silliness and Jack’s meanness, 
respectively. Even though these attributes are not explicitly mentioned, they are 
conventionally associated to cows and rats, respectively. The link between the attribute 
and the animal in these examples is not, however, as clear as it was in (1), (2)  and (3). 
The reasons for considering cows to be fool and rats to be undesirable creatures is not 
so obvious. Nevertheless, physical features and slow movements in the case of cows 
contribute to the association of this animal with stupidity, while behavioral aspects 
(illness transmission, stealing food) trigger the connection between rats and negative 
connotations. In (6) and (7), the features of the animal that we want to use in our 
description of a human being are mentioned. In our view, they need to be mentioned 
due to the fuzzy connection between feature and reality: bats are not blind; in fact, they 
enjoy a sensitive vision that allows them to see more when there is not much light. In 
much the same vein, there is no empirical reason that leads us to think that larks are 
happy. In these cases, cultural conventions are essential for the association, and we may 
envisage a certain degree of arbitrariness in these associations. One may argue that larks 
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are connected to happiness because of their ability to fly and thus enjoy freedom. 
However, every winged animal shares those characteristics, but we do not find 
expressions like “as happy as a sparrow” or “as happy as a robin” in everyday speech. 
For whatever reasons, larks are related to happiness to a certain extent. Consider also 
other idiomatic expressions like What a lark (when something is funny) or To do 
something for a lark (to do something in order to have a good time). So even though the 
lark-happiness and bat-blindness associations are not totally straightforward, they 
become highly entrenched from their frequent conventional use. However, there are 
other English simile-based idioms related to happiness in which the degree of 
motivation can be said to be null, for instance He is as happy as Larry or He is as happy 
as a clam. There are thus several idioms that express the same idea of happiness with 
varying degrees of motivation. This is also the case in the following examples:  
 
(8) It is as easy as ABC. 
(9) It is as easy as pie. 
(10) It is like shooting fish in a barrel. 
 
Examples (8) and (9) share the same syntactic structure. However, (8) bears a certain 
degree of transparency that is absent in (9): it is easy to think that learning something 
like ABC is an easy task, but there is no apparent connection between something easy 
and pie. In turn, the syntactic structure of (10) is different, and so it is its cognitive 
analysis. The adjective ‘easy’ is not mentioned in (10), because the degree of motivation 
is higher than in (8), which is somehow motivated albeit to a lesser extent, and (9), in 
which the motivation is not straightforward. In the case of (10), the situation invoked, 
that is, shooting fishes that are confined to such a small space as a barrel, is a situation 
in which success is guaranteed, so there arises an immediate connection between the 
easiness of the mentioned situation and the easy success of the situation for which the 
idiom is used. 
We should also bear in mind that there are simile-based idiomatic expressions 
whose meaning is apparently arbitrary, but whose creation was motivated by facts that 
we may ignore. This is the case, for instance of He is a mad as a hatter. The association 
of hatters with craziness comes from the neuro-toxic effects of the mercury that was 
used for the making of hats in the XIX century. Another idiom about craziness whose 
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motivation is more transparent is He is as mad as a March hare, which connects the 
excited behavior of hares in March (their mating season) with the crazy ways of a 
person. 
Motivation may also vary cross-linguistically. The Spanish counterpart of He is as 
happy as a lark is Es más feliz que una perdiz (lit. ‘He is happier than a partridge’). In 
this case, the selection of one bird to the detriment of the rest is determined by a 
rhyming pattern. In fact, Spanish also has the expression Es más feliz que un regaliz (lit. 
‘He is happier than licorice’), which follows the same pattern. Another way of 
expressing happiness or joy in Spanish by means of a simile-based idiomatic expression 
is Está como unas castañuelas (lit. ‘He is like castanets’). The motivation that triggers 
the selection of the object in which the simile is based is different here: castanets are 
used for certain types of Spanish dancing, so a conventional connection is established 
between them and happy party times. There is a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy in 
which an object stands for the whole situation in which it is used. This metonymy 
interacts with the Great Chain of Being metaphor PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS. This 
interaction falls into and can be schematized as follows: 
 
 
 
               METAPHOR 
 
 
SOURCE Æ 
 
 
 
TARGET 
 
OBJECTS PEOPLE 
  
Situations in which castanets are 
played  
Happy situations 
  
 
                   METONYMY 
 
 
Castanets  
  
 
Fig. 5. Metonymic expansion of a single-source metaphorical complex in Está como 
unas castañuelas (lit. ‘He’s like castanets’) 
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So far, we have analyzed idiomatic expressions based on an ontological 
metaphor in which there is only one correspondence available for the metaphorical 
mapping. In these cases, the A is B structure is preferred to the simile. In fact, if we say 
John is like a shark, the hearer may consider other options apart from the predatory 
nature of sharks (he may think that John can swim like a shark or can be as strong as a 
shark). This fact has been empirically demonstrated by Glucksberg (2001, 2006) 
through a series of psycholinguistic experiments. 
However, this is not always the case. If we consider expressions like He is as 
meek/gentle as a lamb and He is as innocent as a lamb, we highlight different (although 
somehow related) behavioral features of lambs. In similar ways, She eats like a bird and 
She sings like a bird point out two prototypical (i.e. highly salient) properties of birds 
(i.e. singing very well and eating very little, respectively) that can be metaphorically 
mapped onto the behavior of a person. The cognitive mechanisms involved in the 
understanding of these idiomatic expressions are identical: we single out an attribute of 
the animal in the source domain and map it to the target domain.  
Let us now consider more complex instantiations of simile-based idiomatic 
expressions with underlying ontological metaphors. Consider examples (11)-(13) 
below: 
 
(11) He eats like a pig. 
(12) He behaves like a pig. 
(13) He sweats like a pig.  
 
These similes have their bases on the ontological metaphor He is a pig. In Lakoff and 
Turner’s (1989) terminology, this metaphor exploits the Great Chain of Being: human 
beings inherit all those properties attributable to animals and inferior beings. However, 
the full understanding of their meanings requires further development of the expression, 
which is given by the specific verb that highlights the precise property of the entity 
(animal) in the source domain that we intend to map onto the target domain. 
Nevertheless, it is only one of them the one that reveals the meaning of the idiom. 
According to Ruiz de Mendoza (1997), ontological metaphors are invariably made up of 
only one correspondence. The way in which we make evident the selection of the one 
correspondence to be mapped from the source to the target domain is usually linguistic, 
Alicia Galera: A cognitive approach to simile-based idiomatic expressions 26 
 
 
 
clac 43/2010, 3-48 
 
but the context may make explicit non-linguistic allusions to the highlighted 
characteristic unnecessary. There are several correspondences, but only one is exploited. 
So if we say John is a pig, we need additional (contextual or linguistic) information that 
guides our understanding of John as someone who eats in a disgusting manner, someone 
who behaves in a chauvinist way, someone who sweats a lot, etc. If we say John is a pig 
after Mary has been telling us how badly he has treated her, and what a nasty 
womanizer he is, the background context makes it easy to guess which feature of pigs is 
being applied to John. However, this may not be the case, and we may be in a situation 
in which nothing about John has yet been said, so stating John is a pig may not be 
enough. This is not a problem in the case of simile. Thus, when we utter John eats like a 
pig we linguistically place the focus of our attention on the one correspondence of the 
underlying metaphor that interests us most to the detriment of the others. We may then 
postulate that metaphors that enclose more than one potential correspondence give rise 
to a number of idiomatic expressions with the aim of clarifying the feature of the animal 
that we intend to map onto the human being. It is also important to note that most of the 
features highlighted in these idiomatic expressions are motivated by the animal 
appearance or behavior. Saying that someone eats like a pig establishes a link between 
the amount/way in which a pig and a person eat. However, we may come across more 
complex situations. Thus, when we say that a person (especially a man) is “a pig” (i.e. 
behaves like a pig) we do not have empirical reasons to link the person’s socially 
unacceptable behavior or opinions to the behavior of a pig. In this case, the filthiness of 
a pig is metaphorically understood as “dirty” behavior: we make use of the additional 
metaphor MORALITY IS CLEANLINESS (cf. Lakoff, 2003: 98 for a more detailed 
study of this metaphor). Here we have a clear case of a single-source metaphorical 
complex, in which two metaphors interact in the following way: 
 
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS 
MORALITY IS CLEANLINESS (LACK OF MORALITY IS FILTH) 
 
SOURCE Æ TARGET 
Pig John 
lack of cleanliness (‘filth’) lack of morality 
 
Fig. 6. Single-source metaphorical complex in John is a pig 
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The importance of this analysis will be more evident if we compare it with standard 
analysis of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS in the Cognitive Linguistics literature. We have 
two different approaches. A particularly well-known one was proposed by Lakoff and 
Turner (1989). According to these authors, this metaphor brings out a so-called 
“quintessential” attribute of animals that is previously obtained on the basis of the 
converse metaphor ANIMALS ARE PEOPLE. For example, in Achilles is a lion we 
attribute courage to Achilles because we think of lions as “courageous” animals. But 
‘courage’ is a human property, not a property of animals; the reason why we think of 
lions as having courage is that we interpret their instinctual fierceness in terms of 
human courage. For Lakoff and Turner (1989) these two converse metaphors cancel 
each other out thus giving rise to the conventional ascription of animal ‘courage’ to 
humans. Ruiz de Mendoza (1998, 2010) gives a different account. Rather than two 
converse metaphors that cancel each other out, what we have is a mapping from animal 
behavior (a lion seen as instinctively fierce and aggressive when fighting other animals 
or when chasing and killing its prey) to corresponding human behavior (Achilles as a 
fierce and aggressive warrior chasing and fighting his enemy in an instinctual way). 
Ruiz de Mendoza’s explanation is more elegant than Lakoff and Turner’s for two 
reasons. First, it avoids the need to postulate two metaphors that contradict each other, 
which does not seem to be too economical in cognitive terms, especially if we are only 
dealing with the attribution of one feature to Achilles (i.e. courage). Second, the 
explanation does not fall into the trap of naively reducing the whole range of meaning 
implications that the ‘lion’ metaphor can have to just one property. In fact, the metaphor 
highlights Achilles’ undeterred instinctive fierceness when fighting, which is much 
more than attributing ‘courage’ to him. However, following the logic of Ruiz de 
Mendoza’s account of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, My neighbor is a pig would be a 
matter of finding something in the behavior of pigs that can correspond to the speaker’s 
neighbor’s behavior. Since pigs are not inherently immoral or abusive, we need an 
account that allows for the consideration of metaphorical complexes, as we have done 
above. In the case of the ‘pig’ metaphor the metaphorical complex combines PEOPLE 
ARE ANIMALS with IMMORALITY IS FILTH. Interestingly enough, Ruiz de 
Mendoza’s later work on metaphorical complexes can round off his previous 
explanations of some cases of ontological metaphor.  
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 Example (13), He sweats like a pig, calls for a different type of analysis. We 
know that pigs do not sweat a lot. However, the fact that pigs are dirty animals is one of 
their more salient attributes. Moreover, if a person is dirty, this can be a consequence of 
sweating. We thus establish a metonymic connection between sweating and being dirty 
(CAUSE FOR EFFECT), and a metaphoric mapping between the filth of pigs and the 
consequence of sweating in a person: 
 
 Source    Metaphor  Target 
 
 
 
A pig is filthy                         A person 
        sweats too  
   much 
    Metonymy       Metonymy 
        A pig smells bad      A person   
         smells badly 
 
 
Fig. 7. He sweats like a pig. 
          
        
In other words, in He sweats like a pig we map a pig’s filth (cause) and its stench 
(effect) onto a person’s ill-smelling sweat (cause) and the disgust that it produces 
(effect). The cognitive operations that underlie the analysis of this idiom is schematized 
in figure 8 below. It should be noted that this figure represents another metaphor-
metonymy interaction pattern which is to be added to the proposals in Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Díez (2002). 
Source   Metaphor   Target 
 
 
Source             Target  
  
   Metonymy           Metonymy 
    
 
Target                      Source 
 
 
Fig. 8. Metonymic expansion of the source and target metaphoric domains. 
 
 
On the basis of our analysis, we may suggest that there are different degrees of 
transparency within the array of idioms that arise from the same ontological metaphor. 
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When we talk about transparency, we refer to simplicity as regards the number and 
complexity of the cognitive operations involved. Some of them make use of inherent 
properties and others need to be arranged according to the conventional implications 
that make up for the initial lack of transparency. 
Compare now the following idiomatic expressions: 
 
(14) He swims like a fish.  
(15) He drinks like a fish. 
(16) I felt like a fish out of water. 
 
The meaning of (14) is fully transparent: swimming is an ability which is inherent to 
fishes, so swimming in the same way fishes do means that a person can swim very well. 
The metaphor underlying this idiomatic expression is ontological, as we find only one 
correspondence between the source and the target metaphorical domains. However, the 
fact that there is more than one potential correspondence to be mapped gives rise to an 
idiomatic expression that contains a verb with the aim of specifying the specific 
connection that we want to establish between the source and the target domains. At first 
sight, (15) seems to follow the same pattern as (14). However, the action within the 
source domain to which the metaphor appeals is not so easily apprehended: the 
metaphoric source has a fish in water which we imagine as drinking water all the time; 
there is no effect of drunkenness in the fish. The target has a person that drinks too 
much alcohol and we see his heavy drinking as if it were the constant drinking of a fish 
in water. What is interesting about this metaphor is that the target domain has a drunken 
person, but the fish in the source is not drunk. The drunkenness is obtained in the 
metaphorical target by way of implication (inference) once the basic metaphorical 
layout has been worked out: since we see the person as immersed in alcohol as a fish in 
the water, we infer that the person experiences the effects of an exaggerated contact 
with alcohol. 
Thus even though this idiom seemed so similar to (14) in terms of its linguistic 
structure, upon closer inspection, it turns out that the complexity of the cognitive 
operations underlying it is higher.  
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  Source         Metaphor  Target 
 
  
Fishes drink      
 water constantly     A person drinks         
        alcohol  
  Metonymy     constantly 
       
 Fishes live        
in water       
 
 
 
Fig. 9. He drinks like a fish. 
 
 
It is clear that (16) invokes a situation. In this case, the underlying metaphor does not 
seem to fall within the category of ontological metaphors, as it does not appeal to a 
quality of fishes, but rather to an ideal state (being in water). The situation mentioned in 
the idiomatic expression immediately leads us to think about the state in which a fish 
would be: unable to breath, struggling to survive. This situation maps onto the anxiety a 
person may feel in a situation in which he does not feel comfortable. 
 
 
 Source     Metaphor     Target 
 
      
Inability      Feelings 
to breathe      of otherness 
 
           Metonymy 
A fish  
out of water 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. I felt like a fish out of water. 
 
 
This pattern, which is fairly productive in our corpus of analysis, can be 
schematized as follows: 
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     Source      Metaphor   Target 
 
                  Metonymy      
 
           Source           Target X        X 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Metonymic expansion of the source domain. (Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal, 2002) 
 
 
 Following Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal’s (2002) taxonomy, this is a case of scenic 
metaphor (if we focus our attention on the nature of the metaphorical mapping). Thus,  
although the underlying metaphor can be considered to be ontological (PEOPLE ARE 
ANIMALS), the resulting metaphor is situational. As this metaphor falls into the 
category of emotion metaphors, let us analyze other simile-based idiomatic expressions 
that are not exclusively related to the realm of feelings. In this connection, consider 
examples (17)-(19) below: 
 
(17) He left (like a dog) with his tail between his legs. 
(18) He got up (like an animal) on his hind legs. 
(19) He left like a bat out of hell. 
 
These are examples in which the underlying metaphors are situational, that is, the 
expressions mention a part of a situation that is expanded metonymically within the 
source domain of the metaphor, and which is then mapped onto the metaphorical target. 
Nevertheless, there are differences in their analyses. Examples (17) and (18) follow 
similar patterns. In both idioms, the linguistic element that establishes the comparison 
(‘like a dog’ and ‘like an animal’ respectively) is omitted. This is so because the 
situations invoked are conventionally attributed to dogs in (17) and to animals in 
general in (18). By mentioning a part of a conventional situation in (17) (a dog with his 
tail between its legs), we trigger access to the whole situation (the dog has been beaten 
and leaves feeling scared). In (18), we similarly have access to the complete situation 
(i.e. an animal ready to attack) by mentioning only the physical posture that it adopts. In 
both cases, once the metaphorical source domain has been metonymically expanded, it 
is metaphorically mapped onto the target domain in order to talk about the behavior of a 
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human being in terms of the behavior of an animal. As both situations can be observed, 
the metaphors underlying these two idiomatic expressions fall within the category of 
scenic situational metaphors. 
These two idiomatic expressions can be cognitively analyzed following the 
pattern in figure 4, that is, metonymic expansion of a single-source metaphorical 
complex. 
 The analysis of (19) follows the pattern of interaction described in figure 8 
(metonymic expansion of the metaphorical source domain). However, there is a 
difference that should be pointed out, since in this case the situation depicted in the 
source is not real. This idiom departs from the hypothetical assumption that there is a 
hell and that there are bats in hell. Of course, ‘hell’ is used to indicate a place filled with 
fire. Bats avoid heat and live in dark places, so hell would be the worst possible place 
for a bat. Therefore in the hypothetical source domain, we have the fictional situation of 
a bat flying away as fast as possible in order to escape a place where there is excess of 
heat and of light. But this situation is invoked through a metonymy that links the image 
of bats escaping hell and the way in which they would logically leave (hurriedly). 
Metonymy thus works, as noted by Panther and Thornburg (2004) in relation to scripted 
knowledge, as an inferential schema. 
 
 
 
 
Source                 Metaphor     Target 
 
 
                         Metonymy      
 
      Bats fly away       The way in   The hurried  
from hell     which they                 way in which 
         leave (hurriedly)        a person 
                leaves  
 
                          
         
 
 
Fig. 12. He left like a bat out of hell. 
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Note that this analysis would seem to flout one of the assumptions of Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, according to which the source domain must be tangible or 
conceptually fixed. Nevertheless, the concept of hell is firmly rooted in our culture, and 
conventionally regarded as an imaginary place where nobody would want to stay. As a 
result, the image of bats fleeing a place like that is strong enough to generate a 
metaphor. In fact, other metaphors arise from the heaven/hell dichotomy (e.g. I feel in 
heaven, This tastes like heaven), in which the source domain cannot be strictly said to 
be tangible. Thus, despite the hypothetical nature of the source domain, the feasibility of 
this CMT tenet remains intact. 
Some of these examples combine metaphor or simile with hyperbole. Herrero 
(2009) has discussed hyperbole as a cognitive operation on its own. On the basis of 
previous work in Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez (2003), Ruiz de Mendoza (2010) has 
recently discussed hyperbole in terms of a cognitive mapping where the source is a 
hypothetical domain which contains an extreme case of a scalar concept or situation, 
and the target a real world situation that we want to talk about. For example, ‘a bat out 
of hell’ is a hypothetical source that contains an exaggeration ingredient. In 
interpretation, the exaggeration has to be mitigated, according to Herrero (2009), in 
order to make it reasonable. As a side-effect of the mitigation operation, the addressee is 
led to calculate added meaning effects by means of a relevance-driven pragmatic 
process (along the lines proposed by Sperber and Wilson, 1995 for other types of 
interpretation). In Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez (2003), it is suggested that we have 
a conceptual mapping from a hypothetical source to a real-world target. As a result of 
the mapping, a number of extra meaning effects arise: the protagonist leaves a place in 
fear but probably in not as much fear as a bat would escape from the extreme heat of 
hell. The hypothetical situation has the effect of enhancing the psychological impact on 
the protagonist of the real-world situation. This means that the exaggeration arises from 
the mapping, i.e. from confronting the hypothetical and the real situation. The 
mitigation operation is only necessary to bring down the exaggeration effect to 
reasonable proportions, i.e. from ‘absolutely horrified’ to ‘very frightened, more than 
normal’. 
 We have observed that most of the simile-based idiomatic expressions arise from 
the ontological metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS. If we bear in mind Lakoff and 
Turner’s (1989) Great Chain of Being, animals are the closest to human beings in the 
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chain, that is, the ones that share the highest number of similarities. That is why it may 
seem logical to state that, since animals and human beings share many characteristics, it 
is easier to talk about one in terms of the other. However, idiomatic expressions also 
arise from features of other physical entities connected with human beings. As 
previously stated, the nature of these connections is variable, from very simple one-
correspondence mappings to complex patterns of interaction between several cognitive 
operations. To illustrate, consider (20) and (21) below: 
 
(20) He is (like) a pain in the neck. 
(21) He sticks out like a sore thumb. 
 
These two expressions share the same simple cognitive operation: talking about a 
concrete aspect of reality in order to come to terms with a more abstract one. A pain in 
the neck is something that bothers us, so a person that we would call like that is 
someone we do not like, someone who makes us feel uncomfortable. Example (21) 
follows a similar reasoning schema: when we have a sore thumb, this is quite 
noticeable, and we seem to be aware of it all the time. Thus, when we talk about a 
person in terms of a sore thumb, we map this property onto a human being.  
 Let us now analyze other examples of simile-based idioms involving inanimate 
entities whose underlying cognitive operations are more complex. Consider (22) and 
(23) below: 
 
 
(22) He sleeps like a log. 
(23) He smokes like a chimney.  
 
In these idioms, an activity that is exclusively human is attributed to an object. 
However, there are significant different concerning cognitive operations.  so we may 
analyze them in turn. Example (22) highlights some properties of logs that assimilate 
them to a person who is deeply sleeping: lack of mobility and heaviness. Therefore, 
these features are metaphorically mapped to the source domain: a heavy and motionless 
person. This needs a further turn to achieve the intended interpretation: a heavy and 
motionless person stands for a person who is sleeping in a very deep way, so we need a 
Alicia Galera: A cognitive approach to simile-based idiomatic expressions 35 
 
 
 
clac 43/2010, 3-48 
 
metonymic link: EFFECT FOR CAUSE, that is, we mention the effect to refer to the 
cause. 
 
Source    Metaphor  Target 
 
 
 
             A log is      A person  
  heavy and      is heavy and 
           motionless      motionless 
        Metonymy 
A person  
                        sleeps deeply        
 
 
 
Fig. 13. He sleeps like a log. 
 
 
We have thus a different pattern of conceptual interaction as schematized in figure 14: 
 
 
      Source  Metaphor  Target 
 
 
                                                                                         Metonymy  
    
                             X                 Source          Target X 
       
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Metonymic expansion of the metaphorical target domain. 
 
In the case of (23), the cognitive process is very similar: chimneys do not smoke, but 
there is something in them that reminds us of a person who is smoking: the smoke 
coming out of them. In our view, what makes this expression different is the fact that 
the imagistic component is stronger: we can easily picture smoke coming out of a 
chimney and map it onto smoke coming out of a person’s mouth. Then, we need the 
metonymic link between a person expelling smoke and a person smoking a cigarette: 
EFFECT FOR ACTION. 
Note that these two examples also bear a strong hyperbolic component: a person 
cannot be as motionless as a log, even when he is in a very deep sleep. By the same 
token, a person cannot expel as much smoke as a chimney. These idiomatic expressions 
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suggest that logs sleep and that chimneys smoke respectively, which are unreal 
situations that, as mentioned above, strengthen the impact of the intended meaning. 
The hyperbolic nature of many simile-based idioms is pervasive. Consider example (24) 
below: 
(24) It’s like I have a frog in my throat. 
 
The meaning conveyed by this idiomatic expression is that a person has some difficulty 
in his/her speech due to a small amount of mucus in his/her throat. The linguistic 
expression depicts an unreal situation, that is, a frog inside a person’s throat. This unreal 
situation metonymically leads us to the feeling it would cause to have a frog in one’s 
throat, but of course with a high degree of exaggeration: a frog in one’s throat would 
cause the person to choke rather than to have difficulty speaking. Note that the color of 
the mucus singles out the choice of the object that could be blocking someone’s throat 
in the source domain of the metonymic mapping. The resemblance between mucus and 
frogs can also be extended to their soft texture and slimy nature. 
 
  Source           Metaphor   Target 
      
The hypothetical 
sensation      Difficulty 
it would cause      to speak 
 
           Metonymy 
A frog in 
One’s throat 
 
 
Fig. 15. It’s like I have a frog in my throat 
Example (25) follows a complex pattern in line with Ruiz de Mendoza’s (2008) 
metaphoric complexes: 
 
(25) His memory is like a sieve. 
 
Several metaphors interact for the understanding of this idiomatic expression: 
 
THE MEMORY IS A CONTAINER 
THOUGHTS (MEMORIES) ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS 
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The metaphoric complex that arises from this expression combines image-schematic 
metaphors (the CONTAINER schema and a variant of the IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
metaphor) with a metaphor in which the source domain is imagistic in nature: when 
something is put on a sieve, a great part of it gets out of the sieve due to the holes in it. 
The cognitive structure of this idiomatic expression falls within the category of single-
source metaphorical complex discussed above. The metaphor MEMORY IS A 
CONTAINER is built into the source-target structure of the metaphor THOUGHTS 
(MEMORIES) ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS. Objects that are out of the container are 
not under the effects of this container anymore. As we metaphorically assume that the 
memory is a container, we may also assume that the effect of being within this container 
is being remembered. Therefore, when the container has holes, it is likely that objects 
get easily out of it, thus letting thoughts out of the memory and being consequently 
forgotten. 
 
 
SOURCE TARGET 
Objects  Thoughts  
Objects easily escape the 
container through physical 
holes 
Thoughts easily leave 
someone’s memory 
Container Memory 
  
 
Fig. 16. His memory is like a sieve. 
 
 
What is also worth mentioning in this example is the fact that this metaphorical 
complex allows the combination of image and image-schema metaphors. On the one 
hand, the source domain bears a high degree of imagistic content. When this expression 
is uttered, we have quick access to the image of a sieve, full of holes, letting fluid and 
small particles escape through it. This strong imagistic component is in this case 
essential for the interpretation of the idiom. In addition, the metaphor that is integrated 
within the source-target metaphoric process is image-schematic: we are making use of 
the CONTAINER schema.  
The fact that these two ICMs cooperate within the same idiomatic expression 
leads us to wonder whether image and image-metaphors are so different in nature. 
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According to Lakoff, image metaphors are “one-shot”, in the sense that this kind of 
metaphor maps only one image from the source onto the target domain; therefore, 
conceptual correspondences are allowed in image metaphors. In turn, image-schematic 
metaphors do license conceptual correspondences, which are in fact an essential 
characteristic of their abstract nature grounded in physical experience. This matter has 
drawn the attention of some scholars; Rosario Caballero (2003, 2006) claims that there 
should be no sharp division between conceptual and imagistic metaphors. Using a 
selection of expressions from the architectural jargon she intends to demonstrate that 
image metaphors can indeed map patterns of inference and conceptual knowledge from 
the source to the target metaphorical domains (cf. also Deignan, 2007). However, 
Galera Masegosa (2010) has pointed out that upon a closer analysis of Caballero’s 
corpus we may assume that there is a continuum of cases in which metaphors would 
range from purely imagistic metaphors (Lakoff’s one-shot imagistic metaphors) to 
metaphors whose abstract nature leads us to consider them to be closer to image-
schematic metaphors (cf. Peña, 2003, 2008). In the middle of this continuum we would 
find conceptual metaphors that select only one imagistic feature (a combination of 
images and conceptualizations). Let us see an example of each of these metaphor types 
(Caballero, 2003): 
 
 (i)The basic structure “started with a bowstring truss we took out of the 
building”. 
In this metaphor we find two images (one in the source and another in the target 
domain) that merge into one in the process of metaphorical mapping, so there are 
no conceptual correspondences. Thus, this metaphor is purely imagistic in nature. 
 
(ii) Many architects regard their built artefacts as (…) having ‘wrinkles’ of 
growing ‘bellies’. 
These metaphors fall in the middle of the continuum: they are conceptual in 
nature in the sense that they are closely related to the concept of shape, but there is 
only one feature that is mapped.  
(iii) The decision to air-condition lower-floor public spaces required ingenious 
weaving of ductwork in ceilings.  
Alicia Galera: A cognitive approach to simile-based idiomatic expressions 39 
 
 
 
clac 43/2010, 3-48 
 
In this case, since physical structure is involved, and thus bearing in mind the 
abstract nature of the source domain, the metaphor should be regarded as being 
closer to image-schematic metaphors. 
 
Example (25) shows a case in which the two extremes of the continuum merge 
into one metaphoric complex. The source domain of the metaphor clearly falls within 
the one-shot imagistic metaphors extreme. However, the target domain is not physical, 
but rather a mental construct that we make up in inspired by the physical image. So the 
first ‘anomalous’ phenomenon that we find in example (25) is the fact that the main 
metaphor of the metaphoric complex conjoins a purely imagistic source domain and an 
abstract target domain. Actually, in spite of the imagistic nature of the source domain, 
the main metaphorical is also aided by a conceptual metaphor: THOUGHTS ARE 
OBJECTS. On the other hand, we have the clear image-schematic nature of the 
metaphor that contributes to the final interpretation of the metaphoric complex, that is, 
MEMORY IS A CONTAINER, which belongs to the other extreme of the continuum 
due to its abstract nature. 
There is a simile-based idiomatic expression in Spanish that makes use of the 
same patterns of conceptual reasoning: Está como una regadera (lit. ‘He is like a 
watering can’), which is equivalent to the English idiom He has a screw loose, which 
means that he is crazy/nuts). We can state that the source domain of the metaphor that 
underlies the expression Está como una regadera is imagistic in the sense of Lakoff’s 
one-shot image metaphors: we find water pouring through the holes of the watering can. 
This image is mapped onto the target domain, which is not purely imagistic, but rather 
conceptually constructed on the basis of the physical image of the source domain: we 
mentally picture a head full of holes from which thoughts escape. Thus, we also make 
use of the metaphor PHYSICAL OBJECTS (WATER) ARE THOUGHTS. In this case 
the metaphor that is integrated within the source-target correspondences of the 
metaphoric complex is THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER. However, the implications that 
arise from the fact that thoughts get out of the container easily goes beyond the mere 
forgetting. This expression suggests that the lack of objects (thoughts) within the 
container (head) has craziness as a consequence. Nevertheless, what is important here is 
the fact that the same metaphoric complex that conjoins image and image-schematic 
metaphors operates in both languages in the creation of simile-based idioms. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
From the analysis of the examples of our corpus we may contend that ontological 
metaphors range from those in which one single possibility is available for the mapping 
to those in which there is more than one potential correspondence. The latter are the 
ones that give rise to simile-based idiomatic expressions. Thus, idiomatic expressions 
whose underlying metaphor is ontological arise from: (i) the necessity of pinning down 
which feature is to be mapped when more than one correspondence is available for the 
metaphoric mapping; (ii) the lack of empirical reasons in the connection of the entity 
and the attributed feature. 
We have found that the simile-based idiomatic expressions that arise from the 
same ontological metaphor often differ as regards the complexity of the necessary 
cognitive operations for the understanding of their meanings. For example, we have 
seen that from the metaphor He is a fish we may get different idiomatic expressions that 
call for different cognitive analyses (He swims like a fish only needs a simple one-
correspondence metaphorical mapping; I felt like a fish out of water is cognitively 
analyzed in terms of a metaphoric mapping in which the metaphoric source is 
metonymically expanded;  He drinks like a fish follows the same conceptual pattern as 
the previous one, but needs the aid of implication (inference) for the complete 
understanding of the idiom. 
We have also observed that the degree of motivation in the creation of simile-
based idioms varies intralinguistically. Intralinguistic motivation ranges from examples 
like It is like shooting fish in a barrel, in which the easiness of the situation mentioned 
is carried over to a real life situation, to others like It is as easy as pie, where there the 
motivation is far from transparent at all. In the middle we find idiomatic expressions 
like It is as easy as ABC, in which there is certain degree of transparency. Differences as 
regards motivation are also found cross-linguistically. We saw that there is no 
motivation in expressions like He is as happy as a clam or He is as happy as Harry. 
Other expressions that make reference to happiness like He is as happy as a lark are 
based on a conventional association between larks and happiness, which is also 
reflected in expressions like To do something for a lark. Its Spanish counterpart, Es más 
feliz que una perdiz (lit. ‘He is happier than a partridge’) grounds its motivation in 
rhyming, while Está como unas castañuelas (lit. ‘He is like castanets’) is based on an 
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object that is used in a typical Spanish situation of a happy time. However, there are 
also conceptual patterns of mental associations that can be found in both languages: His 
memory is like a sieve and Está como una regadera hold on to the same set of cognitive 
operations, which involve image and image-schematic metaphors in combination to get 
to a non-imagistic target domain. From the discussion of these cases, we may suggest 
that the division between conceptual and image one-shot metaphors should not be as 
sharp as Lakoff claimed. Rather, we should consider different gradations from pure 
imagistic metaphors to those that are closer to be image-schematic, thus bearing in mind 
the possibility of combining them within the same expression. 
Metaphor-metonymy interactions and metaphoric complexes have proved to be 
essential in the understanding of many of the idioms analyzed in this article. Therefore, 
simplistic views of these cognitive operations should be discarded in many cases. 
As regards hyperbole, we should remark that its use is pervasive in simile-based 
idiomatic expressions, especially when the source domain of the metaphoric mapping 
mentions and metonymically expands a hypothetical situation that exaggerates a real-
world situation.  
Even though the study of idioms has received a great deal of attention over the 
last two decades, further exploration is needed as regards the complex cognitive 
operations that rule their interpretation. This article has attempted to be a starting point 
from which more detailed taxonomical classifications may be established by expanding 
the scope from simile-based idioms to other realizational configurations. 
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